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November 1966] Recent Developments 
FUTURE INTERESTS-Implying a Requirement of 
Survival in Future Interests: Continued 
Confusion-Schau v. Cecil* 
203 
Testator devised a portion of the family homestead to his son 
Everett, but provided that "should my son Everett not survive me or 
he should die without issue, then and in that event, the real estate 
devised to him herein, I devise to my son Cecil Kelly, conditioned 
upon the payment by him of Two Thousand ($2,000.00) to each of 
my daughters.'' After testator's death Everett died without issue and 
the heirs of Cecil, who had predeceased Everett, brought an action 
which necessitated a construction of the instrument. The trial 
court ruled that the gift over to Cecil was conditioned upon his 
surviving his brother Everett so that at Everett's death without issue 
the property did not go to the heirs of Cecil, but rather reverted to 
the testator's estate and, there being no residuary clause, descended 
intestate to the heirs of the testator. On appeal the Iowa Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that one who receives a remainder in real 
property, contingent upon the happening of a dubious and uncer-
tain event, must be alive at the time the event occurs in order for 
his interest in the property to become possessory.1 
Contingent future interests have caused considerable confusion 
in cases in which the holder of the future interest dies before the 
fulfillment of the condition. This confusion stems from a tendency 
by some courts to use the word "contingent" as a shorthand way of 
indicating that the interest holder must survive until a certain time 
or event. A future interest is correctly said to be "contingent" when 
it is subject to a condition, in addition to the termination of the 
prior estate, which must occur before the interest becomes a present 
estate.2 The t:1vo usages of the word are often overlapping, but they 
are not synonymous; although a requirement of survival is the most 
• 136 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa, 1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
1. Principal case at 519. 
2. 1 FEARNE, CONTINGENT RE!',IAINDERS S (10th ed. 1844); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUTI11ES § 101 (4th ed. 1942); 2 POWELL, REAL PROPER.TY 11 274 (recomp. 1966); 2 
SIMES 8c SMITH, FUTURE INIERESTS § 571 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT, PROl'Ell.TY § 157 
(1936). 
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common type of condition rendering an interest contingent, 3 it is 
only one of many types of conditions which may be imposed. 
The Iowa Supreme Court viewed the primary issue as simply a 
question of determining whether Cecil's interest was a vested or 
a contingent remainder.4 It is clear that the court was correct in its 
decision that the interest in question was contingent, since it could 
take effect at the termination of the prior estate only on the uncer-
tain condition that Everett would die without having children liv-
ing at his death.5 The question, however, remains: whether it was 
necessary for Cecil to survive Everett for his interest to become 
possessory. 
The only language in the will which might suggest a condition 
of survival is the requirement that Cecil pay $2,000 to each of his 
sisters. If the requirement of payment is considered personal to the 
holder of the interest, a condition of survival until the date of the 
payment might be implied. Most courts, however, refusing to con-
strue such provisions as a condition precedent to acquiring a right 
to the property, have held that they create a lien upon the property 
to secure payment of the legacy by whoever eventually takes posses-
sion of the property which is the subject of the gift.6 An important 
reason for such holdings is that a reading of the whole will contain-
ing a requirement of payment to other heirs usually reveals that the 
testator's purpose in inserting such a provision was to equalize the 
distribution of his estate among his heirs, rather than to impose a 
condition of survival. The court in the principal case did not even 
consider the possible significance of the payment provision, which 
would indicate that it believed that the issue of survivorship was 
disposed of once the court had found that the interest was contin-
gent. Without further explanation the court said, "When one takes 
only a contingent remainder in real estate conditioned upon the 
3. BROWDER &: '\.\TELLMAN, FAMILY PROPERTY SETILEMENTS 25 (1965); 2 SIMES &: 
SMrm, op. cit. supra note 2, § 575. 
4. Principal case at 518. 
5. One might take issue with the court's characterization of Cecil's interest as a 
remainder, since it was one which had to divest a fee simple estate in order to take 
effect in possession. Such interests have been traditionally known as executory interests 
rather than remainders. 2 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, ,I 272; 1 SIMES 8: SMITII, op. cit. 
supra note 2, § 191; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 25 (1936). The difference in terminology 
is relatively unimportant, however, since Iowa and most other states have, by statute 
or decision, abolished the destructibility of contingent remainders, the characteristic 
which distinguishes them from executory interests. E.g., IowA CODE §§ 557.6-.9 (1962). 
At common law if the preceeding freehold estate supporting the contingent remainder 
and the reversion became united in the same person before the remainder vested, they 
were merged, thereby destroying the contingent remainder. Likewise if a contingent 
remainder did not vest prior to or at the termination of the supporting estate it failed, 
since it could not divest another estate. The Iowa statute abolished both of these 
attributes of contingent remainders. 
6. E.g., Schrader v. Schrader, 158 Iowa 85, 139 N.W, 160 (1912). See also RESTATE• 
MENT, PROPERTY § 262 (1940). 
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happening of a future event he must live until the event occurs in 
order to take any interest in the real estate."7 
The holding in the principal case is not only contrary to the 
historical definition of contingent remainders, but it is without 
support in Iowa law. The Iowa cases cited by the court clearly do not 
justify its holding. In one of the cases cited by the court, a require-
ment of survival was implied by use of the so-called "divide and 
pay" rule which provides that when the only language creating the 
gift is in the direction to divide and pay at a future date, the devisee 
must survive until the time of payment.8 In another case, the use of 
the word "or" in a postponed alternative gift "to A or B" was con-
strued to imply a condition of survival on the part of A until the 
termination of the preceding estate. 9 In the other cases relied upon 
by the court, there were words expressing a requirement of survival 
in the language of the gifts under consideration.10 In none of the 
cases was it held that a condition unrelated to survival implied a 
condition of survival. Moreover, in each of these cases the interest in 
question was found to be contingent because there was a condition 
of survival, not the reverse. 
In the majority of American jurisdictions in which the question 
has been presented, it has been held that when a future interest is 
subject only to an express condition unrelated to survival, an addi-
tional requirement of survival to the time of the fulfillment of the 
express condition is not to be implied.11 Two recent cases from dif-
ferent jurisdictions have stated this proposition very clearly. In 
Estate of Ferry12 the California Supreme Court considered a gift 
which was almost identical to the gift in the principal case. The gift, 
7. Principal case at 519. 
8. Fulton v. Fulton, 179 Iowa 948, 162 N.W. 253 (1917). The "divide and pay" rule 
has been generally discredited as a ground for implying a condition of survival and is 
no longer accepted in Iowa today. See Lytle v. Guilliams, 241 Iowa 523, 41 N.W.2d 668 
(1950); 2 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, 1J 333; REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 260 (1940). 
9. Henkel v. Auchstetter, 240 Iowa 1367, 39 N.W.2d 650 (1949). 
IO. In re Estate of Organ, 240 Iowa 797, 38 N.W.2d 100 (1949); Bladt v. Bladt, 191 
Iowa 1345, 181 N.W. 765 (1921). 
11. See, e.g., In re Ferry's Estate, 55 Cal. 2d 776, 361 P.2d 900 (1961); Hofing v. 
Willis, 31 Ill. 2d 365, 201 N.E.2d 852 (1964); Fulton v. Teager, 183 Ky. 381, 209 s:W. 
535 (1919); Fisher v. Wagner, 109 Md. 243, 71 Atl. 999 (1909); Boston Safe Deposit Co. 
v. Alfred University, 339 Mass. 82, 157 N.E.2d 662 (1959); Anderson v. Anderson, 239 
Miss. 798, 127 So. 2d 423 (1961); Tapley v. Dill, 358 Mo. 824, 217 S.W.2d 369 (1949); 
Colony v. Colony, 97 N.H. 386, 89 A.2d 909 (1952); Matter of Krooss, 302 N.Y. 424, 99 
N.E.2d 222 (1951); Massey's Estate, 235 Pa. 289, 83 Atl. 1087 (1912); Loring v. Arnold, 
15 R.I. 428, 8 Atl. 335 (1887). The textwriters have uniformaly condemned the policy of 
implying a condition of survival from an express condition unrelated to survival as 
unwarranted. See, e.g., 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.25 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 
PowELL, op. cit. supra note 2, ,i 334; 2 SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. supra note 2, § 594. The 
position adopted by the Restatement is that an express condition unrelated to survival 
should not be used by a court as an aid in determining whether there is a condition 
of survival. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 261 (1940). 
12. 55 Cal. 2d 776,361 P.2d 900 (1961). 
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to take effect upon the termination of a trust, was basically "to A 
if he is alive, but if he is dead to his wife arid issue, but if he leaves 
no wife and issue then to B." A died leaving no wife or issue. The 
court, holding that there was no condition of survival upon the gift 
to B who had predeceased A, rejected the argument that because it 
was expressly provided that A had to survive until the termination 
of the trust, the same contingency should be implied as to B. The 
only contingency affecting B's interest was A's death leaving no wife 
or issue, and the court found no reason to imply an additional 
condition of survival.13 In In re Jamieson's Estate14 the Michigan 
Supreme Court dealt with a similar gift which can be expressed 
simply as "to A for life, upon A's death, remainder to B if living, 
and to B's heirs if he is not living." B as well as some of his heirs 
predeceased A. The court held that in the absence of an express 
condition of survival in the gift to B's heirs, none would be implied. 
The court disapproved of earlier cases which had held to the con-
trary and criticized them as reaching "a conclusion required neither 
by policy nor by the express language of the testator."15 
Unfortunately Iowa is not alone in erroneously using irrelevant 
conditions in a future interest to imply a requirement of survival.16 
In some jurisdictions the situation is uncle~r, for the decisions hold 
both ways on the question whether express conditions unrelated to 
survival imply a condition of survival.17 Other jurisdictions which 
have not implied a condition of survival when the contingent gift 
was to a named person have experienced some difficulty when the 
gift was to a class.18 When the type of class involved does not imply 
a condition of survival, there is no reason to imply such a require-
ment simply because a condition unrelated to survival is added, as 
for example in a gift "to A for life, remainder to A's children, but 
if A leaves no children then to B's children." Some courts, however, 
have implied a condition of survival in such a gift because the final 
takers remain uncertain as long as the class can increase in member-
ship.19 This reasoning, unfortunately, fails to recognize that the in-
herent ability of a class to increase in membership is unrelated to 
13. Id. at 786, 361 P.2d at 904. 
14. 374 Mich. 231, 132 N.W.2d I (1965). 
15. Id. at 239, 132 N.W.2d at 5. The court referred to In re Wagar's Estate, 292 
Mich. 425, 290 N.W. 865 (1940). 
16. See Ballentine v. Foster, 128 Ala. 638, 30 So. 481 (1900); In re Coot's Estate, 253 
Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931). The Michigan legislature reversed the holding of the 
last case. See MrcH. COMP. LAWS § 554.101 (1948) (enacted 1931); Stevens v. Wildey, 281 
Mich. 337,275 N.W. 179 (1937). 
17. Compare First Nat'! Bank v. Somers, 106 Conn. 267, 137 Atl. 737 (1927), with 
Bartrum v. Powell, 88 Conn. 86, 89 Atl. 885 (1914). Compare Dusenberry v. Johnson, 
59 N.J. Eq. 336, 45 Atl. 103 (1899), with Potter v. Nixon, 81 N.J. Eq. 338, 86 Atl. 444 
(1913), atf'd per curiam, 82 N.J. Eq. 661, 91 Atl. 1070 (1914). 
18. See, e.g., Drury v. Drury, 271 Ill. 336, Ill N.E. 140 (1915); Stoors v. Burgess, 101 
Me. 26, 62 Atl. 730 (1905). 
19. Jones v. Holland, 223 S.C. 500, 77 S.E.2d 202 (1953). 
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the possibility of a decrease in the class due to an express condition 
of survival. 20 
Quite frequently a contingent future interest is either in the re-
siduary clause, or, as in the principal case, in a will which does not 
contain a residuary clause. If the devisee does not meet the implied 
condition of survival the property must pass by intestacy through 
the testator's estate. In Iowa, as elsewhere, there is a very strong 
tendency on the part of the courts to construe a will so as to avoid 
intestacy on the presumption that the testator intended that his will 
would completely dispose of his property.21 A court's desire to 
avoid intestacy may even be so strong that it will construe as vested 
an interest which traditionally has been considered contingent. For 
example, when faced with a gift in the form of "to A for life, re-
mainder to B, but if B should die without issue then to C," some 
courts have construed C's gift as vested, subject to defeasance if B 
should die leaving issue.22 This somewhat strained construction is 
evidently the result of a belief that the gift to C would have included 
a condition of survival if it had been construed as contingent.23 Con-
sequently it seems incongruous for a court which seeks to avoid 
intestacy to unnecessarily construe a contingent remainder as imply-
ing a condition of survival, since frequently such a construction 
will produce intestacy. _ 
When a court has determined that an interest is "contingent" it 
has not necessarily determined the question of survivorship, but it 
has probably introduced the confusion that may be caused by an 
incorrect understanding of the word "contingent". Thus, when 
faced with the problem of determining whether a future interest 
holder must survive the happening of a contingency, it would seem 
preferable to ignore the question of whether the interest is vested or 
contingent;24 a court need only ask whether the language of the will 
necessitates implying a condition of survival. Unfortunately, a great 
many courts, like the Iowa court in the principal case, have not con-
fined themselves to the relevant inquiry and as a result have only 
added confusion to the law of future interests. Such cases should not 
be relied upon and where they continue to carry the force of 
authority they should be expressly overruled.25 
20. 3 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, ,r 365. 
21. See In re Larson's Estate, 256 Iowa 1392, 131 N.W.2d 503 (1964); Moore v. 
McKinley, 246 Iowa 734, 69 N.W.2d 73 (1955). 
22. See, e.g., Allen v. Almy, 87 Conn. 517, 89 Atl. 205 (1914). 
23. Allen v. Almy, supra; In re Patterson's Estate, 247 Pa. 529, 93 Atl. 608 (1915). 
24. "[I]t is not necessary in this case to decide which of these two possible ap-
proaches is to be applied [holding the interest vested or contingent]. Both have the 
same result upon the major question of the case, that question being whether an 
implied condition of her surviving Joseph J. Ferry is applicable to Mary Silva's 
interest." Estate of Ferry, 55 Cal. 2d 776, 783, 361 P.2d 900, 902 (1961). 
25. See, e.g., Hoffing v. Willis, 31 Ill. 2d 365, 373, 201 N.E.2d 852, 856 (1964), over-
ruling Drury v. Drury, 271 Ill. 336, 111 N.E. 140 (1915). 
